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Handling coordination in an extreme
situation: Tensions in electronic
communication and organizational
emptiness during the 2003 French
heat wave crisis response
Anouck ADROT & Marie BIA FIGUEIREDO
Institut Mines Télécom – Télécom Ecole de Management 
ABSTRACT
This study focuses on email use in extreme situations, in particular organizational crises
in disaster settings. Despite abundant empirical evidence of intensive email use in crisis res-
ponse, the question of the overall support from email to coordination in critical settings has
remained unanswered. Filling this gap, we draw on grounded theory principles to conduct
an exploratory investigation of email use during the 2003 French heat wave crisis response.
We propose a thorough analysis of the crisis responders’ electronic communication prac-
tices when they attempted to address what we label organizational emptiness. Through the
narration of four episodes, our findings outline electronic communication tensions during
the 2003 French heat wave crisis response: email was used by the crisis responders in a
helpful as well as damaging way. Our discussion outlines four contradictory behaviors
among email users - immediate communication but delayed action, centrality in informa-
tion processing but absence in collective action, email use and avoidance, efforts for resi-
lience despite persistent patterns of communication – that impeded organizational empti-
ness resolution, thereby burdening coordination during crisis response. This study enriches
literature in three manners. First, we extend the scope of investigation of extreme situations.
Second we propose organizational emptiness as an original conceptual lens to comprehen-
sively analyze IT use in crisis coordination. Third, we offer insights on technology enact-
ment in extreme situations.
Keywords: Electronic communication, Coordination, Disaster, Crisis response, Grounded
theory.
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RÉSUMÉ
Cette recherche porte sur l’usage de l’email en situation extrême, et plus particulièrement
dans la réponse aux crises organisationnelles provoquées par des désastres. Malgré des
preuves empiriques d’une utilisation intensive de l’email durant les réponses aux crises, les
pratiques de communication électronique dans ce type de contexte ont été peu étudiées et
sont mal connues. En nous appuyant sur les principes de la théorie enracinée, nous avons
donc étudié l’usage de l’email durant la réponse à la crise provoquée par la canicule de
2003. Nous offrons une analyse approfondie des pratiques de communication électron-
ique développées par les acteurs lorsqu’ils répondent à la crise et font face à ce que nous
appelons le vide organisationnel. Structurés autour de quatre récits, nos résultats soulig-
nent les contradictions inhérentes aux pratiques de communication électronique durant
l’épisode de canicule survenu en France en 2003. Il ressort en effet que les usages de l’e-
mail, en même temps qu’ils visaient la résolution du vide, ont souvent contribué à le main-
tenir, voir à l’aggraver. Pour comprendre ce phénomène, nous proposons une lecture en
termes de tensions entre les dynamiques organisationnelles établies et l’expérience immé-
diate de la crise. Cette confrontation a induit un « enactment » ambivalent de l’email, ex-
primé en pratique par quatre formes de contradictions interdépendantes (réponse immé-
diate mais action différée ; utilisation versus évitement de l’email ; centralité dans le
traitement de l’information mais absence de l’action collective ; patterns de communica-
tion persistants malgré un effort de résilience). Cette recherche enrichit la littérature de
trois façons. Tout d’abord, elle étend le champ d’investigation des situations extrêmes à des
situations non préparées et impliquant des difficultés de coordination inter-organisation-
nelle. Ensuite, à partir du concept de vide organisationnel, nous proposons une grille
d’analyse de la communication électronique et de la coordination en situation de crise.
Enfin, nous enrichissons la compréhension des usages des technologies en mettant en évi-
dence les effets indirects de l’enactment de la technologie.
Mots-clés : Communication électronique, Coordination, Désastre, Réponse à la crise,
Théorie enracinée.
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INTRODUCTION
In disasters, crisis responders can
face difficulties to meet the urgent
needs of those affected when they
have to handle coordination problems
within and between organizations
(Quarantelli, 1988). Indeed, as extreme
situations, disasters are characterized
by uncertainty, risk and high-velocity
(Lièvre & Gautier, 2009), which signif-
icantly challenge organizational coor-
dination. In some specific cases, disas-
ters can also trigger organizational
crises that aggravate coordination is-
sues.
Recent research on disasters and cri-
sis response examined how informa-
tion technologies could facilitate coor-
dination in such settings (Van de Walle
& Turoff, 2007). Research in crisis
management has focused on new tech-
nological systems such as Geographic
Information Systems (Zerger, 2003),
Command and Control Systems (Lutz
& Lindell, 2008), and Decision Support
Systems (Mendonça, 2007) or even so-
cial media (Palen et al., 2007). In con-
trast to these technologies, email has
attracted scant attention from crisis
management scholars.  
However, email has been reported to
be one of the most prominently used
tools to exchange data and coordinate
within and between organizations
(Barley et al., 2011; Bia Figueiredo &
Kalika, 2008); Ducheneaut & Watts,
2005). Likewise, literature on crisis
management has provided empirical
evidence that email is intensively used
in crisis response (Danowski & Edison-
Swift, 1985; Farnham et al., 2006; New-
som et al., 1999; Vielhaber & Waltman,
2008). Recent disasters such as the
SARS epidemic in Singapore, the
Tsunami in Sri Lanka or Hurricane Ka-
trina provide vivid illustrations of email
use by crisis responders to coordinate
(Majchrzak & More, 2011; Pan et al.,
2012). However, given existing knowl-
edge on electronic communication, the
anticipation of whether email is likely
to serve as a support or an obstacle in
a specific case remains difficult.
From a theoretical perspective, such
an uncertainty can be partly explained.
Theories such as Media Richness The-
ory (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Daft &
Lengel, 1986) raise important limita-
tions of electronic communication
when complexity and uncertainty are
high. As a lean media, email is likely
not to fit to crisis responders environ-
ment, tasks and communicational
needs. More generally, inner character-
istics and functions of email may facil-
itate as well as impede coordination
during crisis response (Rice, 1990).
Our literature review reveals that ad-
dressing our research question by fo-
cusing on email characteristics does
not provide any satisfactory answer.
Given the lack of theoretical guid-
ance to understand the influence of
electronic communication we address
the following research question: What
support from email to coordination in
crisis response?
Focused on email, this paper is in-
cluded in a larger research project that
considered multiple information tech-
nologies. We completed a qualitative
retrospective analysis of electronic
communication practices during the
organizational response to the 2003
French heat wave. 
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The 2003 French heat wave was a
natural disaster that triggered an orga-
nizational crisis in the response net-
work. Since the beginning of the 2003
summer, the weather had gone scorch-
ing, provoking a dramatic drought,
fires and electrical blackouts. At the
beginning of the month of August, sev-
eral cases of hyperthermia were re-
ported. Emergency rooms rapidly went
overwhelmed with dying patients
while part of administrative organiza-
tions reacted to the disaster with de-
lays. As a result, almost 15,000 people
died between the 4th and the 20th of
August 2003. Email was extensively
used during the response to the 2003
French heat wave crisis response.
However, coordination remained labo-
rious, thereby delaying the response
dramatically.
To provide a comprehensive expla-
nation of email use on the 2003 French
heat wave, this research relies on
grounded theory principles – including
qualitative coding – to analyze email
use during the crisis response.
Grounded theory is a relevant method-
ology to address lack of theoretical
guidance and the need to take into ac-
count the actors’ reality into the analy-
sis (Sousa & Hendriks, 2006). By doing
so, we made a comprehensive theoret-
ical framework emerge from data. Our
findings, through the narration of four
episodes, reveal that crisis responders
relied on electronic communication to
address what we label organizational
emptiness – the absence of operation
of resources and means despite their
being necessary to complete essential
tasks. They tried to alert, find re-
sources, define and deploy means.
However, crisis responders used email
in a helpful as well as damaging way,
revealing tensions in electronic com-
munication. The crisis responders en-
acted email technology in an ambiva-
lent manner, which resulted into
contradictory behaviors, thereby im-
peding organizational emptiness reso-
lution and crisis response. We discuss
in the present paper four of these con-
tradictory behaviors – immediate com-
munication but delayed action, central-
ity in information processing but
absence in collective action, email use
and avoidance, efforts for resilience
despite persistent patterns of commu-
nication. This study provides practical
recommendation but also contributes
to the literature in three manners. First,
we extend the scope of investigation
of extreme situations by examining
inter-organizational coordination in
disaster settings. Second, by proposing
organizational emptiness as an original
conceptual lens to coordination, we
offer a holistic framework to enrich
current knowledge on the role of IT on
coordination. Third, we connect two
topics that have been conceptually re-
lated: IT and organizational dynamics.
By doing so, we offer insights on tech-
nology enactment in extreme situa-
tions.
The paper is structured as follows.
We first review the literature on crisis
coordination and email use. We then
present the case under study, namely
the 2003 French heat wave crisis re-
sponse. In the following section, we
detail our methodology, in particular
the abductive dimension of the analy-
sis process. The findings section is
structured in two parts. First, we pre-
sent the concept of organizational
emptiness that emerged from our anal-
14
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ysis. Second, we narrate four episodes
that depict the influence of email use
on organizational emptiness resolu-
tion. We finally discuss our findings
and present our contribution. The con-
clusion section presents three major
avenues for future research.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
I.1. Coordination issues
and information technology (IT)
in disasters
Defined as “events, observable in
time and space, in which societies or
their subunits incur physical damages
and losses and/or disruptions of their
routine functioning” (Kreps, 1984,
p.312), disasters share common fea-
tures with extreme situations that chal-
lenge coordination in organizations.
The first part of our literature review
poses that disasters expose organiza-
tions to specific coordination issues,
which have increasingly attracted
scholarly attention (Chen et al., 2008;
Der Heide, 1989; Leidner et al., 2009).
While coordination is essential to sur-
vive to a disaster, it is also fragile. Co-
ordination issues in disaster thus reveal
the essential support that IT can pro-
vide to disaster management.
Initially investigated by psychologists
(Bettelheim, 1943), extreme situations
refer to situations characterized by un-
certainty, risk and high-velocity (Lièvre
& Gautier, 2009). First of all, disasters
can suddenly trigger uncertainty within
organizations by causing major and
often highly improbable disruptions
with respect to organizational proce-
dures. As a result, an organization’s
ability to keep working according to its
pre-established patterns of coordina-
tion comes into question. In particular,
sudden need for coordination and
communication between unfamiliar or-
ganizations has proved to cause mis-
understandings and slow down collec-
tive action (Kapucu et al., 2010). Crisis
responders also face challenges when
making sense of the situation, strug-
gling to determine the actions that
should be undertaken (Fink et al.,
1971). Thus organizations can be com-
pelled to redefine inputs, outputs and
processes without a reliable forecast of
possible outcomes of the response
(Quarantelli, 1988; Waugh & Streib,
2006).
Secondly, disasters are risky situa-
tions in that they can cause or aggra-
vate organizational crises. An organiza-
tional crisis “threatens high-priority
values of the organization, presents a
restricted amount of time in which a
response can be made, and is unex-
pected or unanticipated by the organi-
zation” (Hermann, 1963, p.64). Orga-
nizational crises often result from the
conjunction of multiple issues. No only
responding organizations have to deal
with the public opinion’s high-level of
expectations regarding their efforts to
alleviate human suffering and material
damage (Turner, 1976). Also, they
have to handle extra activities and
grant transparency in their decision-
making and logistics (Garnett &
Kouzmin, 2007), which can over-
whelm the crisis responders with addi-
tional tasks and endanger coordina-
tion.
Finally, disasters are characterized by
high-velocity (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt,
1988). Crisis responders need to con-
stantly adjust to an ever-changing con-
15
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text that is characterized by informa-
tional disruptions. As a result, ongoing
collective action can be burdened by
the necessity to achieve new and un-
structured actions (Quarantelli, 1988).
In contrast with the traditionally admit-
ted phenomenon of rigidity-threats
(Staw et al., 1981), an alternate stream
of research acknowledges that coordi-
nation is likely to follow unexpected
deviating patterns, also called improvi-
sation (Crossan et al., 2005 Cunha,
2005; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Mendonça,
2007; Weick, 1993). More recently,
Constantinides and Barett highlighted
that coordination is progressively
shaped by crisis responders’ narration
of their own action (2012). It is critical
to provide current and accurate infor-
mation for organizations to address
these coordination challenges in a dis-
aster (Leidner et al., 2009; Pan et al.,
2012). During Katrina, both the disrup-
tion of informational infrastructures
and the asymmetrical access to infor-
mation affected the partial collapse of
coordination (Comfort & Haase, 2006).
At the same time, Google Earth was
extensively used by rescue services to
document damages and locate the vic-
tims on web maps (Palen et al., 2007).
By offering immediate access to infor-
mation, firefighters in New Orleans
handled coordination despite multiple
obstacles.
Technological information transmis-
sion has been transforming crisis coor-
dination in three manners. First, IT has
provided new opportunities for the im-
provement of coordination. Increasing
actors’ connectivity, IT supports com-
munication across multiple sites and
actors (Constantinides & Barrett, 2012)
and allows access to additional sources
of information, such as crowd sourcing
(Majchrzak & More, 2011). Second,
technology has imposed new require-
ments. If unmet, these requirements
can impede coordination, for example,
when users do not successfully man-
age to convert information formats
(Dawes et al., 2004). Technology also
allows information transmission at a
pace that can make planning inade-
quate (Majchrzak et al., 2007). Finally,
IT use significantly supports crisis co-
ordination at the condition that organi-
zations have previously developed ad-
equate capabilities (Adrot, 2010;
Rerup, 2001). As users of email since
decades, organizations have adopted
skills and capacities in electronic com-
munication. From this perspective,
email appears to be an essential tool
for coordination in disasters. However,
the influence of email on crisis coordi-
nation have not been thoroughly in-
vestigated empirically.
I.2. Email use and crisis
coordination
Literature emphasizes the impor-
tance of electronic communication for
collective action in crisis settings.
Danowski and Edison-Swift reported
that individuals intensively rely on
email when a crisis strikes (1985). Ac-
cording to these authors, not only does
the amount of exchanged messages in-
crease. Also, the content of the mes-
sages and the structure of the commu-
nication network evolve. In particular,
the amount of communicators increas-
es, messages become shorter and more
focused on organizational issues. 
Recent research on disasters pro-
vides some striking examples of email
16
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use by crisis respondents to coordinate
(Majchrzak & More, 2011; Pan et al.,
2012). For example, when the SARS1
outbreak hit Singapore in 2003,
14 government agencies had to devel-
op an ad hoc crisis management sys-
tem to trace the epidemic’s spread.
Through the crisis response, they
heavily relied on email to transmit their
requirements and incrementally devel-
op the system (Pan et al., 2012). Simi-
larly, during the Tzu Chi’s response to
the Sri Lanka Tsunami, email was pri-
marily used between the headquarters
and the ground operation center to
consult, advice and provide feedback
on a daily basis. Thanks to these ex-
changes, Tzu Chi headquarters adjust-
ed operational plans in accordance
with changing circumstances (Pan et
al., 2012). During the San Diego Fires
in 2007, the local public broadcasting
station received from local citizen
emails signaling road closures, shelters
and evacuation routes. On the radio
web site, maps developed in collabo-
ration with Google were frequently
updated according to these emails
(Majchrzak & More, 2011). 
However, the electronic communica-
tion that took place in the case of hur-
ricane Katrina provides cause for
alarm. In the aftermath of the disaster,
more than 1,000 pages of email were
analyzed to determine responsibilities
and failures in crisis response (Melan-
con, 2005). This work revealed that, in
spite of the dramatic number of ex-
changed emails, electronic communi-
cation did not allow the recipients to
grasp about the reality of the victims,
thereby aggravating inertia in decision-
making within the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. 
These examples suggest that, with
varying degrees of success, email is ex-
tensively used for vertical and horizon-
tal, inter and intra-organizational coor-
dination, by formal or emergent
response networks. However, given ex-
isting knowledge on electronic commu-
nication, the anticipation of the influ-
ence of email use on the output of crisis
response remains uncertain. In fact,
inner characteristics and functions of
email may impede as well as facilitate
coordination during crisis response. 
On the one hand, Media Richness
Theory argues that email is a “lean”
media, unable to process rich informa-
tion (Zmud et al., 1990). The asyn-
chronous characteristic of email places
restrictions on feedback. Like other
written media such as letters or
memos, it transmits fewer cues than
face-to-face. Email limits the user’s ca-
pacity to express oneself in a diversi-
fied way or to personalize their mes-
sage. These properties have the
potential to hinder inter-individual
communication and information shar-
ing, in particular when the message or
the task is complex and ambiguous
(Daft & Lengel, 1984; Treviño et al.,
2000). In a crisis context, coordination
and decision-making occur under con-
ditions of high uncertainty and high
equivocality, therefore requiring a
large amount of rich information. Ad-
ditionally, unusual and unanalyzable
tasks are more numerous (Daft & Mac-
intosh, 1981; Perrow, 1967) and re-
17
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quire an information processing that is
“more personal, less linear, more ad
hoc and improvisational” (Rice, 1992,
p. 478). From this perspective, one
could safely assume that relying on
email for coordination in crisis re-
sponse can be inefficient. 
On the other hand, Rice argues that
electronic communication can help ad-
dress constraints that are inherent to
communication in crisis response
(1990). In particular, he points out that
email allows users to store and track
specific strands of ongoing online con-
versations, which helps avoid ambigu-
ity and addresses rapidly evolving situ-
ations related to past information or
expectations. Furthermore, because of
the ability to connect in an asynchron-
ic manner individuals in different de-
partments, locations and schedules,
email “could be used to establish per-
manent but not full-time, managed
but flexible – that is « virtual », commu-
nication and decision-making struc-
tures to handle crises” (Rice, 1990,
p.100).
The Media Synchronicity Theory goes
further by arguing that email can be
highly relevant if combined with syn-
chronic media (Dennis et al., 2008).
Email supports rehearsability, reproces-
sibility and high parallelism. Email re-
hearsability allows “the sender to care-
fully craft a message before
transmission, to ensure that intended
meaning is expressed precisely, thus im-
proving recipients’ information under-
standing” (Dennis et al., 2008, p.587). In
crisis response, rehearsability can be im-
portant because individuals have no
previous experience working with each
other and transmitted information is
new and complex. Reprocessibility also
supports information processing by
“enabl[ing] the sender to reexamine and
consider previously sent content for the
development of understanding” (Dennis
et al., 2008, p. 587). Finally, email sup-
ports high parallelism, which refers to
the media capability “to support multidi-
rectional communication (e.g. simulta-
neous sending of messages to multiple
recipients, simultaneously receipt of
messages from multiple senders)” (Den-
nis et al., p.585). These characteristics
reduce risks of information losses due to
the need to transmit sequentially.
Recent research, by depicting email
as part of diversified IT portfolios for
crisis response – including mobile ap-
plications, social media or internet plat-
forms – illustrates the assets of email
use in critical settings (Stephens et al.,
2013). Future technological improve-
ments are likely to have an impact on
these assets. Given digital convergence,
not only email access is increasingly
embedded in Internet applications and
multiple devices. In addition, email sys-
tems are acquiring new capabilities that
could be highly relevant for coordina-
tion in crisis response. For example,
many email systems now provide func-
tionalities such as push-mail or voice
messaging, which can significantly im-
prove interactivity, thereby conveying
more nuanced emotions. 
Our literature review reveals that ad-
dressing our research question by fo-
cusing on core features of email does
not provide any satisfactory answer.
Email properties and functions devel-
op a “structural potential” whose im-
pact on crisis response will depend on
how users perceive and collectively
use email features (DeSanctis & Poole,
1994, p.127). This point is in line with
18
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ongoing research on electronic com-
munication that has highlighted the
need to further investigate the practical
use of emails by individuals. For in-
stance, Kock (1998, 2001) has ques-
tioned previously held assumptions on
media choice by demonstrating that
users can deliberately choose a media
they perceive as “lean” for complex
tasks, such as process improvement.
Crisis management research has fol-
lowed a similar path by demonstrating
that electronic communication prac-
tices are likely to play a prominent role
during crisis response. Vielhaber and
Whaltman’s analysis of electronic com-
munication during a faculty strike
highlights how the rhetoric present in
emails can help crisis responders to
build their cases to protect their repu-
tation (2008). 
Meanwhile, there has been little ex-
plicit analysis of the ways in which
electronic communication practices
impact coordination between crisis re-
sponders. For this reason, we propose
to address the question of email sup-
port to crisis coordination through an
in-depth, empirical investigation of the
electronic communication practices of
responders to the 2003 French heat
wave crisis. The following section de-
tails our methodological choices and
our research process.  
II. THE 2003 FRENCH HEAT
WAVE
This section provides an overall de-
scription of the effects of the heat
wave and the organizations involved
in the crisis response.
An extraordinary climatic phe-
nomenon, the 2003 French heat wave
caused a dramatic drought during the
months of July and August. Lakes and
rivers were dried-up enough to block
the energy supply (Salagnac, 2007).
The simultaneous effect of the heat
and the drought raised the frequency
of fires and caused energy blackouts at
electrical and nuclear power plants.
Additionally, mortality in the Ile-de-
France region suddenly increased, es-
pecially among the elderly. Despite ex-
tensive documentation on the potential
effects of the climate on the French ter-
ritory and population, the health care
system failed to anticipate the increase
of mortality caused by the heat wave
(Got, 2008). As a result, the death rate
was more than 150% higher than pre-
vious years during the two first weeks
on the month of August (Fouillet et al.,
2006; Hémon et al., 2003). Appendix A
represents both temperatures and
death numbers in Paris between the
15th of June 2003 and the 15th of
September 2003, which illustrates the
simultaneous increase in the number
of deaths and the temperature on the
12th of August 2003.
The response to the heat wave in-
volved a set of 23 types of organiza-
tions that we label the response net-
work in this study. The response
network is composed of three main
groups with specific missions and ob-
jectives that are detailed in the appen-
dices (Appendix B). First of all, the
group of civil protection and police or-
ganizations is in charge of assuring
public security and order in routine sit-
uations. In critical situations, these or-
ganizations have the additional re-
sponsibility of providing civil
19
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protection and emergency services,
such as caring for injured people and
organizing rescue operations. This
group mainly includes the Paris Fire-
fighter Brigade (BSPP) and Paris Police
services. Both of these services are
under the authority of the Paris Prefec-
ture of Police (PPP). Similarly, the PPP
is under the authority of the Minister of
the Interior of France.
Secondly, the group of health care
organizations is in charge of taking
care of injured and sick people. This
group includes three types of organiza-
tions with distinct levels of responsibil-
ities. Local actors such as emergency
medical services and hospitals handle
patients’ flow, diagnosis and care. Re-
gional organizations manage and regu-
late medical activities in Paris and its
surroundings. Some national organiza-
tions from the group of health care or-
ganizations manage the funding and
organization of health care activities
within France. Other organizations
from this group are in charge of alert-
ing all the health care organizations
when some disaster is likely to happen
such as the National Health Watch In-
stitute (INVS).
Finally, we identified a third group
of organizations that were involved in
crisis response. We label this group
“outsider organizations” because these
organizations were not entitled to re-
spond to the heat wave. However, out-
sider organizations had a significant in-
fluence on the development of crisis
response.
Figure 1 represents the connections
between the organizations that were
involved in the response to the 2003
French heat wave crisis. Organizations
with national responsibilities are repre-
sented on the top. Progressively mov-
ing towards the bottom one can find
organizations with regional and local
responsibilities. As the legend ex-
plains, unidirectional arrows signify hi-
erarchical top-down connections. Bidi-
rectional arrows represent strong
cooperational ties. Finally, links with
no arrow corresponding to ad hoc
connections that emerged between or-
ganizations during the heat wave. 
In August 2003, the heat compro-
mised the ability of the response net-
work to perform its duties, thereby
putting the organizations into crisis.
Civil protection and health care organi-
zations partially failed at protecting the
lives of vulnerable citizens. Emergency
rooms were overwhelmed with pa-
tients and the civil protection services
did not manage to prevent outdoor
and indoor fatal faints. As an increas-
ing number of people suffered from
the heat, hospital mortuary chambers
became overcrowded and funeral
homes were unable to manage the in-
creasing number of corpses. The fol-
lowing week, the Health Minister, the
National Health Watch Institute and the
National Health Agency failed to pro-
vide the public with an accurate esti-
mation of the number of deaths. It
took an entire week for the Health
Minister to enact the emergency plan,
also known as the “White Plan” that in-
cluded directions to cope with a sud-
den increase in the number of casual-
ties caused by a disaster.
The 2003 French heat wave not only
triggered internal organizational crises
but also paralyzed transversal coordi-
nation within the response network,
which resulted in a national political
20
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scandal. More specifically, the ex-
tremely high temperatures led to two
fundamental tensions between the
health network’s objectives and its ac-
tual functioning during the heat wave.
First of all, hospitals were lacking in-
formation, knowledge, administrative
support, energy and material resources
that they usually draw from regional
and national administrative organiza-
tions. Secondly, the public health sys-
tem could not share information and
coordinate properly to optimize re-
source allocation. While more than
15 employees were mobilized to write
one note alerting the public to the sit-
uation, help was desperately needed
to simply hydrate patients in hospitals.
Each organization had internally set-
tled crisis management teams and
21
Figure 1. Organizations involved in the 2003 French heat wave crisis
response.
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meetings. However, information was
not shared between the groups of civil
protection organizations and medical
organizations.
We provide in Appendix C a
chronology of the events of the crisis
that we developed from the systematic
examination of the interactions be-
tween actors. We triangulated this
chronology with two chronologies pre-
viously developed in the literature
(Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Lagadec,
2004).
III. METHODOLOGY
The research method in this study is
qualitative and retrospective. We fol-
lowed the grounded theory approach,
as defined by Corbin and Strauss
(1990). The grounded theory approach
aims to build alternate explanations of
social phenomena by rigorous coding
processes. Thus, our analysis involved
the application of abductive reasoning.
To start, we triangulated three sources
categories of data: i) 800 pages of pub-
lic hearings, ii) 13 semi-centered retro-
spective interviews and iii) internal
archives – emails, faxes- and external
archives as secondary data – newspa-
pers, international reports and essays.
III.1. Research settings
Our rationale for a grounded theory
approach is threefold and abides by
existing recommendation (Glaser &
Strauss, 1973; Locke, 2001; Sousa &
Hendriks, 2006; Suddaby, 2006). First
of all, there is deficient theoretical
guidance on email use in crisis re-
sponse: existing theoretical frame-
works are undeveloped or do not pro-
vide satisfying answers to our research
question, which signifies the need for
theoretical enrichment. Secondly, core
concepts of electronic communication
and crisis response remain loosely
coupled. As a result, an inductive ap-
proach is adequate to clarify the con-
nections between the concepts being
studied. Thirdly, the observation of
participants is necessary to respond to
our research question given the lack of
knowledge on email users’ behaviors.
The research process was completed
in 28 months from May 2008. As this
research is in line with grounded theo-
ry canons, data collection was con-
ducted iteratively. Our criteria for data
collection were repeatedly adjusted on
the basis of intermediate outcomes of
document analysis, coding, presenta-
tions and discussion with other re-
searchers. Our theorizing was similarly
iteratively refined on the basis of feed-
back from other researchers.
III.2. Data collection and coding
analysis
Data was collected between 2008
and 2010; three sources of data were
explored.
First of all, secondary data was col-
lected via systematic reviews of region-
al and national newspaper archives,
essays and testimonies of the 2003
French heat wave. Documents retained
for analysis were rigorously selected
on the basis of their scientific reliability
and their proximity with the topic. Ap-
pendix D provides a list of the docu-
ments considered relevant for analysis
22
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at the beginning of the research pro-
ject.
Secondly, we collected transcripts of
public hearings. 65 individuals in-
volved in the crisis response that took
place during the aftermath of the heat
wave in the months of September and
October. The public hearings focused
on the interactions that occurred be-
tween various actors – including elec-
tronic, phone or even face-to-face in-
teractions – which made them
particularly interesting for our re-
search. In particular, interviewees were
systematically asked who they had in-
teracted or coordinated with, the rea-
sons for their interacting (or not) with
other actors, what information they
had access to. The public hearings are
free for download from the parliamen-
tary chambers web sites2. Interviewees
provided their own mails and faxes to
support their testimonies during the
public hearings. These documents
were attached in the appendices of the
national reports produced by the par-
liamentary chambers.
13 retrospective interviews were
conducted since the beginning of the
project with diverse actors within the
group of health organizations. Our ra-
tionale for focusing on this part of the
response network for interviews is that
health care professionals were on the
front scene of the crisis response and
therefore very likely would have
played a major role in the coordination
effort. Each interview lasted for at least
one and a half hours. The theme dic-
tionary used for interviews was refined
progressively. We stopped after 13 in-
terviews, when the whole analytical
process attained theoretical and se-
mantic saturation. We met 4 individu-
als from the operational personnel
(ERT, nurses from geriatric services),
5 individuals from hospitals’ direction
(CIO, directors, Human Resources di-
rectors) and 4 top-directors of the
health network. To complete these in-
terviews, we relied on the phone to
preliminarily identify actors who had
been directly involved in crisis re-
sponse. After each interview, we relied
on snowball sampling techniques by
asking to interviewees who they had
coordinated with during the crisis re-
sponse. Retrospective interviews sup-
ported data triangulation and provided
data on dimensions that were less
prominently mentioned in public hear-
ings. Semi-centered retrospective inter-
views started at the beginning of the
project and were completed simultane-
ously to an extensive search for
archives on the Internet and the analy-
sis of the public hearings.
Following a grounded theory
methodology, we coded all data with
the exception of secondary data. We
coded data through the four steps that
Corbin and Strauss recommend to fol-
low (1990): microanalysis, open cod-
ing, select coding, axial coding. We
then identified categories from this
data. We transformed these categories
into concepts, which corresponds to
23
2 Url : http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rap-enq/r1455-t2.asp
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the abstraction process as defined by
Strauss and Corbin (2008). 
III.3. An abductive theory
building approach 
Our analysis was iterative. By going
back and forth between data and find-
ings, we formulated hypotheses from
the data and we confronted these hy-
potheses with more data. 
For example, the concept of organi-
zational emptiness presented in the
Findings section, emerged from itera-
tive cycles of data coding and litera-
ture review for conceptual refinement.
At the beginning of our analysis, we
completed a microscopic analysis of
the segments of the public hearing
transcripts that we had selected for
analysis. During selective and axial
coding, we identified categories such
as “death”, “lack of resources”, “diffi-
culty to be understood” that we
merged into the concept of organiza-
tional holes.
To refine our analysis, we per-
formed semantic and theoretical re-
search on the distinction between or-
ganizational holes, vacuum, void or
slack. Void or vacuum refer to a
“space filled with nothing”, therefore
conveying the idea of non-existence
that did not fit to the crisis respon-
ders’ search for innovative solutions.
Organizational holes (Burt, 1992) cor-
respond to disparate events or lacks
but our analysis rather suggested that
the crisis responders a concomitant
and diffuse feeling of lack. Finally,
organizational slack, defined as an
objective evaluation of existing but
unused resources (Bourgeois, 1981),
contrasted with the experiential di-
mension of our data. 
We eventually opted for the notion
of emptiness that conveyed the idea
that some resources or means were
interdependently missing and pre-
vented actors to complete processes
on the usual track. Emptiness defines
a space “vacant or unoccupied”, free
for reinvention. In old English, empti-
ness referred to the lack of occupa-
tion. According to the Thesaurus dic-
tionary, young people would refer to
their emptiness to signal they were
single. For further details on the defi-
nition of organizational emptiness,
please refer to the findings section.
We kept on relying on an abductive
reasoning to then test the following
hypotheses: i) Email use primarily ag-
gravated organizational emptiness, ii)
organizational emptiness was inher-
ent to email use. Discussion between
the authors helped reject i) because
empirical data provided evidence that
some electronic communication
helped the crisis responders to ad-
dress a lack for outputs and process-
es, as demonstrated in the findings
section. In addition. ii) was rejected
as empirical data proved that organi-
zational emptiness was experienced
even when email was not used. 
IV. FINDINGS
The findings are presented in two
steps. First, we introduce and detail the
concept of organizational emptiness
that emerged from our following of the
grounded theory principles in our
analysis. Second, we detail the influ-
ence of electronic communication on
24
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We detail this concept as a theoreti-
cal code (Strauss & Corbin, 2008) that
we used as an analysis grid to coordi-
nation issues during the 2003 French
heat wave crisis response. Emptiness
has already been documented in man-
agement sciences, but our definition of
organizational emptiness has emerged
through an iterative comparison be-
tween theories and empirical data.
In this study, organizational empti-
ness refers to the absence of operation
of resources or means in spite of their
being necessary to perform a specific
process. The notion of organizational
input involved in this definition is
two-fold, referring to organizational
resources and means. Barney (1991)
provides a fair definition and a typol-
ogy of various resources that an orga-
nization can miss. By following Bar-
ney’s approach, we identify two main
types of organizational resources: 1)
tangible such as objects and people or
2) intangible such as competencies,
cognitive frameworks and informa-
tion. Additionally, we draw from
Mintzberg’s definition of organization-
al means (1979). There are six types
of means that refer to the mechanisms
of coordination: processes, outputs,
instructions, informal connection be-
tween individuals and groups, norms
and skills. Derived from this concep-
tualization, organizational emptiness
can be understood as a paralysis of
coordination and therefore, a paraly-
sis of crisis response. 
Following a realist approach, we
propose that the concept of organiza-
tional emptiness is both intransitive
and transitive. Organizational empti-
ness is an intransitive matter to the
extent that a mismatch between re-
source allocation and the individuals’
needs is an objective fact. During the
2003 French heat wave, the number
of deaths objectively exceeded the ca-
pacity of mortuary chambers. Similar-
ly, no information system devoted to
inter organizational coordination ex-
isted at that time. However, individu-
als also made their own experience of
emptiness. Even though emptiness
has an independent existence from
human subjectivity, individuals per-
ceived emptiness through the experi-
ence of crucial lacks during the heat
wave.
Being both intransitive and transi-
tive, organizational emptiness has an
independent existence that one can
hardly understand in its entirety. An
individuals’ perception of a lack of re-
sources or means does not necessarily
imply that these resources and means
do not actually exist. In the aftermath
of the heat wave, crisis responders
eventually understood that some re-
sources and means that they missed at
the time of the crisis response actually
existed. For example, hospitals expe-
rienced shortages of medicines de-
spite considerable stocks. In this case,
emptiness stemmed from the rigidity
threat in relation to resource supply
processes.
Addressing the confusion caused by
the absence of operation of necessary
resources and means, individuals and
groups experience cognitive disso-
nance, as defined by Festinger (1957).
25
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This situation can provide an opportu-
nity for actors to develop behaviors
that deviate from established paths col-
lectively. Burt, who founded the theo-
ry of structural holes, explained how
ambiguities in human agency could
raise unexpected behaviors such as
opportunistic strategies (Burt, 1992;
Burt, 2004). This connection is consis-
tent with French sociology that ac-
counts for emptiness as an opportunity
for actors to develop their reflexivity
(Alter, 2000) and power (Crozier &
Friedberg, 1977). Finally, the garbage
can theory depicts the frequency of
ambiguity in processes and how it
causes unexpected interactions among
decision makers (Cohen et al., 1972).
IV.2. Electronic communication
and organizational emptiness
in the 2003 French heat wave
Facing organizational emptiness, the
crisis responders were compelled to
reinvent their coordination practices
by finding new resources and develop-
ing ad hoc means. Crisis responders
relied on email to accomplish this.
However their electronic communica-
tion practices only partially helped ad-
dress organizational emptiness, which
burdened crisis coordination. Table 1
presents a summary of the findings
section. It represents the various di-
mensions of organizational emptiness
and details the communication prac-
tices that supported organizational
emptiness (OE) resolution, the partici-
pation of email users in solving OE,
the email features involved as well as
the organizational dynamics involved
into electronic communication. 
IV.2.1. Raising an alarm:
the case of tangible resources
Crisis responders relied on email to
send out an alert about shortages of
material resources. The administrative
personnel who received these mes-
sages from operationals responded
quickly and forwarded them to multiple
recipients, thereby supporting the alert-
ing process. However, despite vivid de-
scriptions of these shortages, the opera-
tionals did not succeed at sharing a
common representation of the prob-
lems caused by organizational empti-
ness. The operational personnel even-
tually abandoned email for other media
to coordinate improvised solutions.
Many material resources were missing
from hospitals. Medical personnel were
in need of beds, ice and air condition-
ers. Personnel improvised by using
non-traditional materials to cool down
rooms because the building structures
were not adapted to high temperatures.
In other cases the resources were avail-
able but not usable. In many hospitals
the water was too hot to be consumed
or to refresh patients.
Electronic communication was used
by ERTs to alert on this type of lack
and send requests regarding material
resources. As one of them stated:
26
3 Actors and institutions were anonymized when possible.
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“Many elderly die in emergency
rooms indirectly or directly from hy-
perthermia. Three people have died
in Gamma3 [hospital] so far. The
Emergency Room [ER] personnel, at
least ours, has been totally over-
whelmed with patients. Some pa-
tients wait for 4 or 5 hours on a
stretcher. We have to search for
more beds and have deleted all our
scheduled medical interventions. I
have never experienced such a situ-
ation in 25 years. The situation is
really serious”.
While this ERT’s message was for-
warded to persons who had the pre-
rogative to provide such resources,
the needs mentioned by the ERT in
this email were not satisfied. The for-
ward button was extensively utilized.
By doing so, the recipients of this
message protected themselves by
showing off their reactivity and trans-
parency as professionals. In addition,
they transmitted information as it was
rather than reformulating initial con-
tent into new requests. Unsurprising-
ly, they showed limited commitment
to responding to the requests.  As a
result, both direct and indirect recipi-
ents of this message did not interpret
the situation to be as critical as it in
fact was. Their attention did not re-
sult in the initiative to respond to the
ERTs’ demands.
“Thank you for the information you
transmitted earlier about heat
strokes in the Alpha and Beta3 hos-
pitals. I relayed it internally. The
INVS has just settled an emergency
data collection process. You will
find attached the necessary forms.
All these documents have been sent
to hospitals. The person to contact
is….”.
Responding again, the ERT’s re-
sponse unveiled statistical issues re-
lated to data collection and further
expressed the need for help:
“Thanks for your message. We have
sent messages everywhere. The
problem with data is that they will
not reflect indirect effects of hyper-
thermia (…). The situation is des-
perate here. The government […]
should trigger the White Plan or an
emergency plan very quickly. As I
made my promise to your col-




the email but no discussion was de-
veloped on data collection. It is inter-
esting to note the email response to
the ERT who had alerted administra-
tive actors focused on a long-term in-
vestigation project rather than imme-
diate action:
“Thank you for the information.
Beyond the current investigation we
intend to lead a long-term investi-
gation on the total mortality that
will take into account some specific
pathologies such as cardiac, vascu-
lar, and respiratory diseases. Our
project has to be validated but we
hope that an international compar-
ison will be feasible”.
Consequently, these difficulties bur-
dened the development of a shared
understanding of the situation and
crisis responders primarily relied on
informal communication through
phone and face-to-face meetings to
28
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respond to these needs. As an ERT
described, medical students went into
restaurants and bars that were located
nearby the hospitals to ask for ice: 
“I asked for bottles of water. My supe-
rior did not understand why I was
urging her so much to get it. Yes, we
had some water. But it was too hot to
drink. So students who had come
back from their vacation asked in
bars for some ice. One of the girls be-
hind the bar told me: “It is the only
thing I can do””.
IV.2.2. Filling with content:
the case of intangible resources
In the summer of 2003, no system
was capable of tracking patients to de-
tect any work overload in hospitals.
Consequently, the response network
could barely manage to evaluate the
number of fatalities and the extent to
which the White Plan should be enact-
ed. Organizations were missing not
only informational but also cognitive
resources to determine whether the sit-
uation was critical. As explained dur-
ing the public hearings, the BSPP de-
fined an ad hoc code to deal with the
absence of informational codes report
fatalities caused by the heat.
“We had to invent a new code, this
code was called “syndromes due to
heat”. We had not thought about this
code previously”.
Organizational emptiness also
stemmed from the crisis responders’
difficulties to interpret data. The ad-
ministrative personnel hardly managed
drawing an overall evaluation of fatali-
ties from the disparate and unstruc-
tured signals they received by phone,
fax and email, as suggested by an ad-
ministrative director:
“I completed this unique, simple task:
sending a fax and an email to in-
form the ER that they had to contact
the INVS if required. (…) Here is the
situation at that moment: I would
like to get more quantitative data to
identify any increase in ERs’ activity.
I would like to get qualitative data as
well, to evaluate the gravity of the sit-
uation of patients. My main problem
is the heterogeneity of information
systems. If everyone sends one’s own
detailed and specific message, then
managing information becomes al-
most impossible. I delegate the daily
reading of information bulletins to a
collaborator. However, this bulletin
comprises a lot of very detailed but
useless information. It is therefore
necessary to question the way we can
transform information into a fact
that can be analyzed from a scientif-
ic perspective. It is therefore neces-
sary to design information systems
that make sense”.
The absence of an information sys-
tem devoted to the identification of
deaths was frequently mentioned in
electronic communication. To address
this issue, the crisis responders relied
on email to address organizational
emptiness collectively:
“The heat has been causing a grow-
ing number of problems. We have re-
ceived disparate but alarming pieces
of information from the DDASS (…).
Could you possibly think about a pro-
cess to monitor fatalities or a system
to collect and analyze data? Thank
you (…)”.
29
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Email asynchronicity and multi-ad-
dressability supported collective rea-
soning, thereby helping the adminis-
trative personnel discuss strategies to
collect data. However, the recipients
remained focused on long-term solu-
tions for reporting and monitoring of
fatalities and barely mentioned imme-
diate actions that needed to be un-
dertaken, which prevented the de-
ployment of intangible resources in
time.
IV.2.3. The avoided truth:
the case of norms, skills
and informal connections
On the morning of 8 August, the re-
sponse network became over-
whelmed with patients. Multiple crisis
responders were confused about
what needed to be done and how to
address the situation. At that moment,
the crisis responders experienced or-
ganizational emptiness with respect
to norms, skills and informal connec-
tions. The firefighters addressed the
absence of a predefined norm regard-
ing information transmission about
death rates by informally seeking ad-
vice from physicians. With respect to
skills, the physicians lacked expertise
in hyperthermia. Being convinced
that the patients’ symptoms were due
to some infectious disease, they used
antibiotics, which proved to be inef-
fective, as patients would die in their
hands. The crisis responders did not
have informal connections pre-estab-
lished between each other, as an op-
erational actor explained during the
public hearings: 
“I would have been able to transmit
data and alerts. But to who? I have
no supervisor to contact in case of
problems”.
Addressing organizational empti-
ness with respect to norms, skills and
informal connections primarily ex-
cluded electronic communication for
three main reasons. First, the email
users restricted their exchanges to the
topics targeted by the recipients and
the message title whereas addressing
emptiness required extended discus-
sion about alternative topics. As a re-
sult, the crisis responders could de-
velop skills only since some
physicians spent an entire Friday
night on the Internet searching for in-
formation about hyperthermia and its
effects:
“[A physician] collected data on hy-
perthermia on the Internet. He al-
ready knew that heat can kill but
did not understand how. On Fri-
day, he used free access to research
documents and read over every-
thing. Then he discovered the same
thing had happened in Chicago in
1995” (Jacquat, 2003).
Secondly, discussion on norms and
skills was correlated with conflicts
and controversies that were conduct-
ed primarily orally. The crisis respon-
ders perceived email as a traceable
media and remained careful about
any content shared via electronic
communication. Email users were re-
luctant to share bad news and de-
bates, which promoted politically
correct information at the expense of
exchanges on norms, skills and infor-
mal ties between individuals. On 11
August, when more than 5000 per-
sons had already died, email mes-
30
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sages still conveyed the impression
that the situation was normal:
“For the first time since the begin-
ning of the heat wave calls, the
DDASS called the DGS on the last
Friday, to inform them of deaths
due to the heat among hospitalized
patients. We attempted to draw an
overall evaluation of the situation
with the SAMU and the BSPP…
which confirmed that the last 48
hours had been critical but that the
situation was under control”.
Collective discussion and reflection
remained weak through email. As
one of the interviewing members of
parliament suggested during the pub-
lic hearings:
“Another source confirmed that
nothing happened on the 9th and
the 10th. No alert, nothing. I think
that curiosity is necessary among
the administrative personnel”.
Finally, email users faced difficul-
ties developing sustainable connec-
tions with other crisis responders.
The diversity of organizations and
functions within the network partly
accounts for this issue. Operational
actors were struck by the heat, the
feeling of being powerless against
death and the lack of water. In the
administrative sphere, the feeling of
crisis was less strong. While email use
helped by sharing a common sense,
the administrative personnel general-
ly did not figure out that the situation
was critical. As one of the crisis re-
sponders explained: 
“Before I arrived on the 11th of Au-
gust I had received no phone call
during my break. I had 300 emails
to read and no one clearly men-
tioned the heat wave”.
To the contrary, the operational
personnel had the feeling of not
being “heard” and “seen” through fax
and phone interactions, which coun-
tered the experience of organization-
al emptiness.
IV.2.4. Building from scratch:
the case of instructions,
processes and outputs
The response network had not faced
high temperatures since 1976, which
made it necessary to define new in-
structions, processes and objectives to
face the situation. For example, ad hoc
instructions regarding the management
of mortuary chambers were transmit-
ted from institutional actors. Other in-
structions recommended the post-
ponement of scheduled medical
interventions to focus efforts on hy-
drating patients who were suffering
from hyperthermia. As an administra-
tive director explained:
“There were sudden shortages of re-
sources in many facilities. […] We
gave directions so that hospitals
would help assisted living facilities
manage shortages. The situation
was unusual. We instructed drug-
stores to get more medicines to or-
ganizations that were in critical sit-
uations”.
Some directions transited via email
communication. Being familiar with
daily use of email, administrative ac-
tors responded quickly to new direc-
tions. For example, on 6 August 2003,
one of the Health Minister advisers ex-
plained to his counterparts his concern
31
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about the effect of the heat on citizens’
health. He suggested to administrative
managers – his subordinates - the need
to produce a formal recommendation
memo about hyperthermia in direction
to health care organizations and pro-
fessionals:
“It would be useful to send a memo to
recall basic precautions to care for
the youngest and oldest patients.
There are plenty of studies about the
health related impacts of heat waves
(…). I think the CDC [Center for Dis-
ease Control in Atlanta] reviewed
them. They could result into an
emergency message”.
Administrative actors responded the
same day to this request, demonstrat-
ing their immediate understanding of
their superior’s needs and their intel-
lectual involvement to provide imme-
diate feedback:
“I called [colleagues] to discuss what
could be done [to investigate the
health related impacts of the heat
wave]. First of all, we should take into
account whether it is feasible or not.
We therefore should collaborate with
organizations that already have an
information system and data from
previous years. Here is our idea: we
can try to bring information up to
the INVS rather than settling for a
specific data collection system”.
However, the sender’s strategy to
keep a courteous tone prevented his
interlocutors from perceiving the need
to act immediately. In addition, a sig-
nificant amount of energy was devoted
to process narration. Within the same
process, electronic communication
was extensively used to trace emerging
processes and outputs. Between 4 Au-
gust and 6 August, more than 60
emails were sent to update the status
of the production of an alert message.
Taking advantage of multi-addressabil-
ity, interlocutors suggested to multiple
users their being professional and
showed off their transparency:
“As we agreed, here is an update,
which informs about 4 or 5 new
pathological cases in our depart-
ment. I discussed with Dr. C who is in
copy in this email to which I joined a
press release”.
In this specific case, the investigation
was not perceived as immediately nec-
essary and remained incomplete by
the end of the heat wave. 
In the midst of the confusion, crisis
responders relied on email to send
alerts about organizational emptiness,
find new resources and develop new




During a disaster, coordination with-
in and between responding organiza-
tions is challenged by uncertainty, risk
and high-velocity. The present paper
addresses the role of email in support-
ing coordination in such settings. In
this section, we first provide answers
to our research question. We then pro-
pose an explanation, thereby empha-
sizing the role played by tensions in
electronic communication in coordina-
tion issues.
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V.1. Handling coordination
in extreme situations:
what support from email?
Our findings identify email as a cru-
cial tool for coordination in crisis re-
sponse (Danowski & Edison-Swift,
1985; Farnham et al., 2006; Vielhaber &
Waltman, 2008). During the 2003
French heat wave, the crisis respon-
ders heavily relied on email to cope
with uncertainty, risk and high-veloci-
ty, which are all inherent features of
extreme situations, with varying de-
grees of success. In this section, we
detail this specific point and compare
our findings and those of similar situa-
tions faced by organizations respond-
ing to other disasters.
First of all, the 2003 French heat
wave crisis responders spontaneously
turned to electronic communication to
handle the uncertainty they were fac-
ing. However, they hardly established
new patterns of communication that
were necessary to address this uncer-
tainty. The Melançon report highlight-
ed similar difficulties during the Katri-
na disaster, where email users did not
engage any action regarding crucial is-
sues despite the desperate need for
quick decision making (2005). The
management of the SARS epidemic in
2003 offers a contrasting view on email
use and uncertainty. In less than 13
days, Singapore officials managed to
develop and constantly improve an ad
hoc emergency system mainly through
electronic communication. By doing
so, they adapted to an unexpected sit-
uation in a timely manner through
electronic communication.
Secondly, email users’ enactment of
traceability resulted into contradictory
responses to risk. When improvisation
was necessary, email users’ appre-
hended potential criticism of their own
actions. In this specific case, their risk
aversion with respect to communica-
tion was strong. To the contrary, email
users showed a tendency to show off
their reactivity and transparency when
they perceived that the action they had
engaged was likely to be applauded
by their hierarchy. To the best of our
knowledge, recent research has not
provided empirical evidence of a simi-
lar situation faced in another disaster.
Thirdly, the email users did not ade-
quately address high-velocity during
the heat wave episode. They experi-
enced difficulties in making sense of
the ever-growing volume of unstruc-
tured and heterogeneous set of data
provided by emails. The 2007 San
Diego Fires offers a contrasting view
on high-velocity. In this case, diverse
actors extensively used email to ex-
change, aggregate and update distinct
formats of data. As a result, the crisis
responders produced an ad hoc sys-
tem that represented a map of fire
perimeters (Majchrzak & More, 2011).
Table 2 details the extent to which
email use helped responders to coordi-
nate and address issues caused by un-
certainty, risk and instability.
V.2. Difficulties to address
organizational emptiness through
electronic communication
The second part of the discussion
provides an explanation to the com-
parative analysis developed here in.
Despite the 2003 French heat wave cri-
sis responders’ difficulties, electronic
33
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communication is an essential tool to
deal with coordination issues caused
by extreme situations. In line with this
point, our work emphasizes that crisis
responders relied on email to handle
organizational emptiness, e.g. the lack
of operation of resources and means
despite their being necessary for the
completion of a process. Such evi-
dence echoes Markus’s assessment of
email as a primary media for coordina-
tion even when context or tasks are
less analyzable (1994). However, de-
spite the crisis responders’ efforts,
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Through a thorough analysis of elec-
tronic and in-person communication
practices, our work reveals that email
was used both in a damaging as well
as helpful way in the 2003 French heat
wave crisis response. Are these coordi-
nation issues strictly a matter of media
choice? By applying the Media Rich-
ness Theory, one could assume this
failure was predictable. From this per-
spective, privileging email, as a “lean
media”, for crisis coordination boils
down to an inappropriate media
choice. Our work objects to this sim-
plistic approach to electronic commu-
nication in crisis response. Not only
our literature review highlights the
functional specificities of email that
support crisis coordination but our
findings also identify email as an en-
abler of reactivity, transparency and
transversality between geographically
and temporally distant users. In sum,
we second Markus’s idea that email
richness does not solely account for its
use. We additionally argue that elec-
tronic communication is characterized
by tensions. A tension has been docu-
mented as a situation characterized by
opposing dynamics (Dougherty, 1996).
Tensions can result in ambivalent atti-
tudes and contradictory behaviors
(Smith & Tushman, 2005).
The 2003 French heat wave enacted
email characteristics in an ambivalent
manner. Stakeholders reacted to the
crisis they were presented with and
took advantage of email characteristics
to support information transmission
and coordination. Nonetheless, email
users also utilized this media as a
means to protect themselves from ac-
countability within their organization’s
political arena. Power dynamics that
were established before the crisis did
not fade away, no matter how extreme
the situation became. Furthermore,
these dynamics contributed to the cri-
sis responders’ tendency to perform
behaviors and actions that burdened
coordination. This interplay between
critical settings and the persistence of
organizational characteristics resulted
into the expression of four main con-
tradictions that defined electronic com-
munication in crisis response, thereby
leaving coordination issues unsolved.
In the following paragraphs, we detail
and discuss these contradictions.
Immediate reaction with delayed
action
The crisis responders benefited from
email asynchronicity and multi-ad-
dressability to conduct collective ad
hoc discussion on the lack of operation
of material resources and instructions.
In these specific cases, electronic com-
munication promoted fast response
but did not result into immediate ac-
tion, thereby leaving organizational
emptiness acknowledged but unad-
dressed. This contradiction finds an il-
lustration in the finding section’s
episode entitled ‘Raising an alarm’,
where the lack of beds remained un-
addressed despite its vivid description
by the ERT and the administrative in-
terlocutors’ reactivity. In our view, the
lack of emotional involvement from
the administrative personnel echoes
previous research on the brain-finger
disconnect syndrom (Weber, 2004) and
excessive attention towards email
treatments (Sumecki et al., 2011). From
this perspective, the administrative re-
cipients achieved the tasks they were
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in charge of by processing the received
emails but did not focus on the burn-
ing issues that were signaled and re-
quired immediate action. Paradoxical-
ly, actions such as sending or replying
to email were immediately achieved at
the expense of the actions requested




Because of multi-addressability and
traceability, electronic communication
conducted some interlocutors to inter-
act with numerous colleagues and
counterparts. By doing so, these email
users developed what was previously
reported as centrality in information
processing, which stems from email
users’ ability to connect users, scan
information sources, disseminate and
transmit information to influential
users (Cucchi & Fuhrer, 2007). Our
findings, in particular the episodes
entitled ‘Filling with content’ and
‘Building from scratch’ depict some
actors from the response network de-
veloping these abilities and becoming
centralized contributors to electronic
communication. However, these ac-
tors remained focused on their elec-
tronic interactions. As a result, they
remained marginalized from collective
improvisation, extemporaneously co-
ordinating within the response net-
work to address organizational empti-
ness. As illustrated in the episode
entitled ‘Raising an alarm’, some op-
erational personnel emphasized
through email their need for beds and
other resources but eventually fa-
vored informal interactions when they
improvised collectively. These elec-
tronic interactions aggravated the ex-
clusion of the email users from collec-
tive action. We observe a strong in-
volvement from the email users in
electronic communication at the ex-
pense of action.
Email as an opportunity
to support coordination
and a professional threat
Depending on the dimensions of or-
ganizational emptiness, crisis respon-
ders developed divergent intentions of
use. With respect to resources, crisis
responders used email to alert others
about organizational emptiness. They
also used email to collectively produce
ad hoc means for coordination, out-
puts such as bulletin boards or instruc-
tions and ad hoc processes such as the
collaborative production of a press re-
lease. To the contrary, email was
avoided when discussing norms, dif-
fusing skills and settling on informal
connections. In our view, email users
were reluctant to write on the tacit di-
mensions of these means that are pri-
marily communicated orally. As a re-
sult, the 2003 French heat wave crisis
responders utilized some specific fea-
tures of email as both an opportunity
and a threat. For example, the forward
function of email supported a quick
diffusion of information when some
operational personnel tried to raise an
alarm. However, this function inhibited
discussion on deviation from estab-
lished procedures in the episode enti-
tled ‘An avoided truth’. As another ex-
ample, traceability significantly helped
to narrate processes and develop new
outputs in the episode entitled ‘Build-
ing from scratch’. However, this fea-
36
011-56 Adrot_11-57 Adrot  16/04/13  17:31  Page36
26
Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 18 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol18/iss1/2
HANDLING COORDINATION IN AN EXTREME SITUATION…
ture was also perceived as a potential
threat against the expression of alter-
nate solutions. This duality refers to ac-
tive and passive traceability strategies
analyzed by De Vaujany (De Vaujany,
2001) and previous work on email as a
factor of control and empowerment
(Boukef Charki, 2008). This finding
also echoes previous work on the link-
age between adaptive use and percep-
tion of technology as an opportunity
and a threat (Beaudry, Pinsonnault,
2005). Alternate theoretical grounds,
such as the Critical Social Theory (Ng-
wenyama & Lee, 1997) would enrich
our understanding of such tensions.
For instance, in the episode entitled
‘An avoided truth’, instrumental and
strategic action went into opposing. By
using email, the 2003 French heat
wave crisis responders relied on avail-
able technologies to accelerate speed
of communication, thereby optimizing
crisis response. However, this instru-
mental action contrasted with the ac-
tors’ strategic action, e.g. avoiding
some topics in emails, that stemed
from their awareness of the “rules of





Email users strove to use email to
collectively address an unexpected
situation but hardly managed to
adapt their communication patterns.
As illustrated by the episode entitled
‘Building from Scratch’, the email
users kept in mind power dynamics
and strictly abode by established
rules of politeness. By focusing on
these rules, they lightened the strict-
ness of their tone, which prevented
the recipients from perceiving the sit-
uation as an emergency that required
immediate action. The episode enti-
tled ‘Filling with content’ provides
another illustration of disconnect be-
tween efforts for agility but persistent
communication patterns. The admin-
istrative personnel addressed the lack
of information through intensive data
collection and figures by email. How-
ever, the data collectors failed at
making sense of the amount of infor-
mation collected in a timely manner.
As a result, official statistics regarding
fatalities did not rise until the funeral
homes released their own figures.
The crisis responders’ inability to
adapt their practices for a richer com-
munication prevented them from ad-
dressing organizational emptiness.
The Channel Expansion Theory (Carl-
son & Zmud, 1999), which relates
communication richness to users’ ex-
perience, provides some explanation
to this tension. Despite email’s re-
hearsability (Dennis et al., 2008), the
2003 French heat wave crisis respon-
ders lacked familiarity with the con-
text of organizational crisis, alert re-
lated messages and topics. In
addition, they had limited experience
with communicating with unknown
counterparts. According to Carlson
and Zmud, these three experiential
threads have a significant impact on
communication richness. Thus further
investigation could focus on the exis-
tence of a learning curve between
email users’ experience of extreme
situations and their ability to coordi-
nate to address organizational empti-
ness. 
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Our study emphasizes the impor-
tance of tensions related to electronic
communication in extreme situations.
These tensions appear as highly influ-
ential factors affecting the persistence
and aggravation of organizational
emptiness during crisis response. On
this premise, we infer two managerial
recommendations to manage these
dualities that can undermine an orga-
nization’s ability to cope with disas-
ters. 
First, we question organizations’ ten-
dency to focus on investments in IT
tools that are specifically designed to
optimize access to information. De-
spite communication failures, the 2003
French heat wave crisis responders
spontaneously turned to email to ad-
dress organizational emptiness. From
this perspective, our findings advocate
email as a potentially reliable and prof-
itable tool to support coordination in
crisis response. 
Second, as a practical guideline, we
propose that organizations promote
“good practices” related to the use of
email (Bia Figueiredo & Kalika, 2008).
Such an initiative could optimize their
efforts to successfully address organi-
zational emptiness during responses
to disasters. We suggest that an orga-
nization can meet this goal by draw-
ing users’ attention to the problematic
behaviors that we examined during
the 2003 French heat wave such as
signaling behaviors, brain-finger dis-
connections (Weber, 2004) and other
misuses (Sumecki et al., 2011). In ad-
dition, organizations could gain inspi-
ration from the High Reliability Orga-
nizations (HRO) practices (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001) to improve their use of
email. Using codes to specify the type
of action related to the message or
forwarding emails to experts rather
than hierarchical superiors are exam-
ples of recommendations that could
be made to users. Finally, we suggest
that organizations promote the devel-
opment of adaptive strategical capa-
bilities (Kock, 1998; Kock, 2001) to
help crisis responders break patterns
of communication that exhibit persis-
tent issues. We believe that crisis sim-
ulation exercises could be excellent
opportunities to apply these guide-
lines.
VI.2. Theoretical contribution
Our discussion provides an interpre-
tation of the influence of email use on
coordination issues in extreme situa-
tions. Our approach to electronic com-
munication contrasts with prominent
studies on this media (Dennis & Kin-
ney, 1998). We not only consider email
use in an extreme situation. In addi-
tion, we rely on a grounded theory ap-
proach, which has been scarcely used
so far in research on electronic com-
munication. Thanks to its originality,
this work enriches the literature in
three primary ways.
First of all, our work extends the va-
riety of cases examined within litera-
ture about extreme situations. The lit-
erature on extreme situations has
mainly focused on intra-organizational
coordination (Bouty, 2011) in organi-
zations that develop specific skills for
organizational resilience (Weick & Sut-
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cliffe, 2001), such as military combat
or polar expeditions (Lièvre & Rix-
Lièvre, 2011; Nizet & Pichault, 2011).
In contrast with this stream of re-
search, we explore coordination be-
tween organizations with weak rela-
tional ties and diverse degrees of
familiarity with regards to time con-
straints and emotional pressure. Even
though the 2003 French heat wave
represents a worst-scenario case as a
combination of disaster and organiza-
tional crisis settings, our paper pro-
vides an alternate perspective on ex-
treme situations that highlights its
inherent tensions. In particular, elec-
tronic communication practices renew
when a crisis strikes but are also
shaped by deeply rooted organization-
al dynamics. By proposing an alter-
nate approach to extreme situations,
our work highlights the difficulties for
common organizations to survive this
kind of events. 
Secondly, our work enriches current
knowledge on the role of IT on coor-
dination during crisis response by of-
fering a holistic framework that in-
cludes the concept of organizational
emptiness. Prominent studies on IT
support to crisis response have fo-
cused on technological requirements
and features (Van de Walle & Turoff,
2007) or on organizational dynamics
(Milburn et al., 1983; Pauchant & Dou-
ville, 1993). Our work bridges two
strands of research that have had little
rapprochement. By doing so, our in-
vestigation goes further than merely
putting into perspective the pros and
the cons regarding email use in crisis
response. Rather, we provide a com-
prehensive framework that involves
technological features, crisis settings
and organizational dynamics. Specifi-
cally, the concept of organizational
emptiness, that emerged from field
data, enables an alternate understand-
ing of coordination issues during disas-
ters. Indeed the concept was particu-
larly helpful to put into perspective
individuals’ efforts for coordination
and their communication practices.
This stance promoted a rather counter-
intuitive report of email in this paper.
Frequently tagged as a trivial topic for
research, this paper highlights the
complexity of electronic communica-
tion practices. Our approach to email
thus recalls the relevance of a practice
view on technology use rather than the
pursuit of technological features opti-
mization.
Thirdly, by examining technology
enactment in crisis settings, this work
bridges two topics that, despite signif-
icant efforts from some authors (Men-
donça et al., 2007; Mendonça & Wal-
lace, 2007; Roux-Dufort & Vidaillet,
2003), have been rarely conceptually
related so far: IT use and organiza-
tional dynamics in extreme situations.
Not only does our work echo previ-
ous work that highlighted paradoxical
patterns in technology use. Further-
more, it reveals that the enactment of
certain technological characteristics
(Orlikowski, 2000; Weick, 2011) can
cause tensions in electronic communi-
cation that have the potential to en-
danger organizational survival in ex-
treme situations. For the first time, we
add technology use into the panel of
variables traditionally considered by
scholars as crucial factors of an orga-
nization’s survival in crises, such as
organizational resilience (Rerup,
2001) or improvisational capabilities
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(Mendonça et al., 2010). We suggest
that technology enactment can im-
pede organizational coordination in
extreme situations. By doing so, we
complement previous research that
has rather focused on sources of re-
silience in extreme situations (Lièvre
& Gautier, 2009).
CONCLUSION
Recent research has stressed that IT,
in particular email, is massively used in
critical settings (Leidner et al., 2009;
Pan et al., 2012). While we have
known for a long time that email is an
essential tool for coordination
(Markus, 1994), crisis management re-
search has focused its attention on
new generational tools, at the expense
of a thorough analysis of electronic
communication in critical contexts. As
a result, the question of the overall
support from email to coordination
during critical situations has remained
unanswered, despite coordination
being a topic of continued importance
for organizations involved in disasters
(Quarantelli, 1988).
This study draws on grounded theo-
ry principles to conduct an explorato-
ry investigation of email use during
the 2003 French heat wave crisis re-
sponse. Specifically, we examine the
influence of email use on organiza-
tional emptiness during the 2003
French heat wave. By doing so, we
bring into focus the importance of ten-
sions related to electronic communica-
tion on the handling of organizational
emptiness in crisis response. These
tensions culminate into i) an ambiva-
lent enactment of email characteristics
and ii) contradictions in electronic
communication and crisis response. In
other words, while the crisis respon-
ders spontaneously turned to email to
resolve organizational emptiness, their
contradictions made email use coun-
terproductive.
Our work, however, does not de-
nounce email as an irrelevant technol-
ogy for disaster management and crisis
response. To the contrary, our findings
provide a nuanced view on the tool,
with undeniable sources of support to
crisis coordination. We emphasize the
importance of electronic communica-
tion practices into the equation of
email use in disasters. In addition, we
propose some practical guidelines to
promote a better use of email in crisis
response.
Despite all our efforts, this research
calls for further investigation and chal-
lenging viewpoints on our results. In
particular, we propose three avenues
for research that we view as a neces-
sary extension of this study.
First of all, additional investigation is
needed to determine the importance of
the role of organizational emptiness in
extreme situations. Our work focuses
on a specific case of extreme situations
that involves administrative and opera-
tional personnel. Heterogeneity of or-
ganizations and actors is commonplace
in disaster settings. In addition, crisis
response often involves numerous or-
ganizations and stakeholders with
weak, if not inexistent, relational ties.
One could thus safely assume that or-
ganizational emptiness is inherent to
large scale disasters that involve nu-
merous actors. We believe this view
can conduct managers to misleading
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conclusions. For this reason, future re-
search is necessary to test and enrich
the concept of organizational empti-
ness with empirical data from various
cases of extreme situations.
Secondly, confronting our findings to
an actor-network analysis would help
refine our understanding of email use
in crisis settings. Networks, whether
they are informational (Pan et al.,
2012), organizational (Kapucu et al.,
2010), or social (Lang & Benbunan-
Fich, 2010), have been increasingly at-
tracting scholarly attention in the crisis
management field. The actor-network
sociology (Latour, 2005) provides an
integrative analysis of heterogeneous
sets of actors – labeled as association
of actants - who experience disrup-
tions. Disasters, as defined in our liter-
ature review, correspond to this type
of reality. Not only do crisis respon-
ders have to coordinate with unfamil-
iar groups of individuals but they also
physically, emotionally and organiza-
tionally experience disruptive contexts.
This work suggests that non-politically
correct topics can be avoided in elec-
tronic communication. Thus, adopting
the actor-network posture on contro-
versies (Hussenot & Missonier, 2010)
appears as a promising way to provide
alternate insights on crisis response.
More specifically, we believe that this
perspective can extend and nuance
our description of how electronic com-
munication tensions influence organi-
zational emptiness. However, the
actor-network approach represents a
methodological challenge that is diffi-
cult, if not impossible to pair with data
from the field of the 2003 French heat
wave. Even though retrospective data
was abundant, we could not exhaus-
tively trace and describe interactions
between actants within the response
network. Future empirical research
could be designed to systematically
trace interactions during a disaster.
Thirdly, the comparison of our find-
ings to 2012 empirical cases of disas-
ters corresponds to another possible
extension of the present research. By
focusing on email rather than a specif-
ically designed technology, we some-
what optimize chances to generalize
our findings across disaster cases.
Email, is by far the most probably used
technology in disasters and its basic
functionalities have essentially re-
mained unchanged since 2003. Docu-
mented as the most prominently used
technology in organizations (Barley et
al., 2011), email remains one of the
most accessible technologies for orga-
nizations that face disasters. Despite
reports of email as a core support to
crisis response through the years (La-
lande et al., 2003; Majchrzak & More,
2011; Melancon, 2005; Nelson et al.,
2011), recent evolutions in email use
and design suggest the need to con-
front our findings with ongoing
changes with respect to email use. First
of all, email users’ learn from their
practices over decades of use (Van
Den Hooff, 2005), which implies that
nowadays crisis responders may have
developed knowledge on how to han-
dle the tensions resulting from elec-
tronic communication that we identify
in this work. A longitudinal design
would help to determine whether cri-
sis responders actually learn to effec-
tively use electronic communication to
address organizational emptiness oc-
curring during crises. Secondly, one
could argue that nowadays email ap-
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plications encompass a broader variety
of formats than they used to. Tradition-
al email interfaces have been substitut-
ed by electronic communication appli-
cations embedded in social media
interfaces such as Facebook and Twit-
ter. In addition, smartphones have
been increasingly used in disasters
(Palmer et al., 2012), making electronic
communication more interactive. As a
result, the type of data transmitted
through electronic communication is
broader and can include tweets,
videos, pictures and maps. The er-
gonomics of email, e.g. smaller screens
and embedded interfaces can also
have an impact on how email users
deal with organizational emptiness.
Future investigation could explore the
influence of these ongoing evolutions
on tensions inherent to electronic com-
munication.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Temperature and death numbers in Paris between
the 25th of June to the 15th of September
Appendix B. Organizations involved in the response network
Appendix B.1. Sanitary
organizations in the Parisian health
network
1. National organizations
The Health Ministry also called Le min-
istère de la Santé: The Health Ministry ac-
tivities are related to health services, health
insurance and social welfare in France.
However, this ministry delegates many of
its responsibilities to national organizations
such as the DGS (more detail in the follow-
ing paragraphs). The Health Minister col-
laborates with his or her cabinet advisers
who play a significant role in decision
making in the ministry.
The National Health Watch Institute or In-
stitut National de Veille Sanitaire (INVS): The
INVS’s role is to warn and alert when some
phenomenon is likely to affect French peo-
ple’s health. The INVS’ mission is to watch
potential sources of epidemic and injuries at
national and international levels. When the
INVS identifies a potential health threat, it
then provides its recommendations to the
DGS that implements them. The INVS was
created in 1998 but in 2003 most field actors,
such as physicians, did not know of its exis-
tence and name. 
National Health Agency or Direction
Générale de la Santé: The National Agency
for Health is in charge of developing and
implementing programs for health at the
national scale. Coordinating with the INVS
to implement the monitoring/alerting sys-
tem is part of its responsibilities as well.
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Hospitalization and Health Care Orga-
nizations Agency or Direction de l’hospi-
talisation et de l’organisation des soins
(DHOS): This agency’s task is to organize
health care activities in France, relying on
coordination with the DDASS and DGS. In
particular, this organization is devoted to
the allocation of financial resources. Re-
cently, its mission has expanded to the
management of the coordination between
the diverse actors involved in health issues.
2. Regional organizations
Local Agency for Social and Health or
Départementale de l’aide sociale et sani-
taire (DDASS): The DDASS is in charge of
social and health matters in French regions
and counties. The DDASS delegates to sub
agencies that are located in Paris (DASS
75) and the Ile-de-France counties (for in-
stance DDASS93, DDASS94).
Ile de France Hospitalization Agency or
Agence Régionale Hospitalière d’Ile de
France (ARHIF): The ARHIF manages and
coordinates hospitals, in particular when
national programs and projects are imple-
mented. For instance, there has been a
specific program to promote hand washing
by professionals. This project provided
washing solutions, communication dis-
plays, etc.
Parisian Agency for Hospitals Manage-
ment or Assistance Publique des Hopitaux
de Paris (APHP): The APHP is in charge of
managing 39 hospitals in the Parisian re-
gion, which includes all hospitals in Paris
intra muros and some hospitals in the
neighborhoods of Paris. The APHP regu-
lates funding, resource allocation, patient
flows and alerting. The APHP hospitals
have a strong identity, calling the head of
the APHP the “core”. As a result, conflicts
between the APHP and the DDASS com-
monly occur because of these two organi-
zations have equal responsibilities in some
hospitals.
3. Local organizations
Hospital personnel: Each hospital is in
charge of the quality and the coordination
of its health care activities. Hospital per-
sonnel include managers, administrative
personnel and medical personnel. While
the managers are responsible for the back
office management such as human re-
sources, information systems, quality and
performance measurement, another set of
administrative personnel handle coordina-
tion between services and surrounding
hospitals and assisted living facilities. From
a medical standpoint, each hospital gathers
diverse specialists from psychiatric to
emergency practitioners. Professional val-
ues are strong among medical staff such as
physicians, Emergency Room Technicians
(ERTs) and nurses. Public and private hos-
pitals hardly coordinated with each other
during the heat wave (Evin, 2004). How-
ever, hospitals personnel were retrospec-
tively appraised by national organizations
for their courage. Most of the hospitals per-
sonnel faced their overwhelming workload
and relentlessly worked at treating patients
despite their suffering from the heat and
exhaustion (Evin, 2004; Lalande et al.,
2003).
Emergency Room (ER) personnel: This is
a special group within medical staff. While
people who suffer from long-term diseases
get planned treatments, patients who spon-
taneously suffer from injuries are treated in
emergency services. Emergency rooms
were overwhelmed during the heat wave.
Officials did not recognize Emergency
Rooms Technicians (ERT) as medical spe-
cialists in 2003. For this reason they were
extensively represented by trade unions
such as the AMUF.
Private physicians: Private medical activ-
ity is now very segmented and highly spe-
cialized (Poutout, 2005). Some private
physicians practice in double locations:
they see patients in a private medical prac-
tice as well as in hospitals and clinics. Co-
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ordination between physicians and other
health care organizations is controversial.
Some private physicians were criticized for
not being available during crisis response
(Lalande et al., 2003). As a result, hospitals
were missing staff but could not contact
physicians. During public hearings, the
specialization of physicians was claimed to
be a social issue. For older people who
have multiple sources of suffering, it is
complicated to find a physician who is ex-
perienced and knowledgable about their
specific needs.
Assisted living facilities also called Étab-
lissement d’hébergement pour Personnes
Âgées Dépendantes (EHPAD): Establish-
ments that offer apartments and health
support for the elderly. During the heat
wave, administrative actors struggled to
grant sufficient access to hydrating re-
sources to both EHPADs and hospitals.
However, EHPAD are eligible for access to
resources in surrounding hospitals in case
of important shortages: when the EHPAD
staff is overloaded with patients, their
counterparts in hospitals are called upon to
take care of them, therefore alleviating the
workload of the EHPAD staff. During the
heat wave, mortuary chambers in many
EHPADs were overloaded. In most cases,
even the surrounding hospitals could not
manage all the corpses, which provoked
more confusion within EHPAD. 
Physician network for emergency service,
called SOS Médecins: This non-profit orga-
nization involves physicians who offer mo-
bile medical intervention for emergencies
at home. As other emergency services, they
experienced an overwhelming increase in
requests between the 4th of August and the
14th of August. Public hearings revealed
that they had interacted with journalists
since the beginning of the crisis. 
Emergency ambulance service, called
Service d’Assistance Médicale d’Urgence
(SAMU) and Emergency and Ressuscita-
tion Mobile Service, called Service mobile
d’Urgence et de Réanimation (SMUR):
SAMU and SMUR’s memberships are com-
posed of emergency medical practitioners
who provide mobile and immediate help
to people who are injured. It provides
phone assistance as well, with the objec-
tive of providing medical advice for emer-
gency situations. Emergency ambulance
services coordinate with hospitals when
they cannot treat their patients with mo-
bile devices. They also coordinate with
firefighter squads but provide a different
service in that the SAMU first tries to ad-
vice by phone before intervening. More-
over physicians are less numerous among
firefighters than within SAMU. The emer-
gency ambulance services extensively co-
ordinate with firefighter squads (BSPP).
During the crisis, firefighter squads and
the SAMU developed ad hoc information
systems together.
Appendix B.2. Civil protection
& internal affairs organizations
The objectives of the civil protection or-
ganizations are twofold. First of all, they
have to maintain public order and protect
the civilian population from terrorism and
large-scale accidents. Secondly, they have
to provide support to civil protection in
critical situations. The civil protection orga-
nizations’ mission is oriented towards secu-
rity. For this reason, these organizations
abide by strict rules of operation. For in-
stance, the BSPP refused to transmit data
about deaths to the INVS without an offi-
cial authorization from the Paris Police Pre-
fecture on the 11th of August.
1. National organizations
Internal Affairs Ministry, called Min-
istère de l’Intérieur: This ministry is at the
head of the civil protection organizations.
Its involvement in the crisis response ef-
forts was initiated on the 12th of August. On
the 13th, this ministry intervened by provid-
50
011-56 Adrot_11-57 Adrot  16/04/13  17:32  Page50
40
Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 18 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol18/iss1/2
HANDLING COORDINATION IN AN EXTREME SITUATION…
ing military beds for the purpose of stock-
ing corpses.
The Inter-Ministry Coordination Agency,
also called Le centre opérationnel de ges-
tion interministériel des crises (COGIC):
The COGIC organized inter-ministry meet-
ings between the Internal Affairs Ministry,
the Health Ministry and the Social Affairs
Ministry on the 12th of August to collective-
ly find solutions to specific issues such as
corpses storage and electrical blackouts.
2. Local organizations
Paris police authorities also known as
Préfecture de Police de Paris (PPP): This
organization is responsible for the protec-
tion of citizens. PPP is additionally in
charge of police services and the adminis-
trative processes related to identification
documents.
Paris Police Prefecture local agencies:
PPP local agencies exist in every adminis-
trative region, or arrondissement, in the Ile
de France region. PPP services directly in-
tervene when called. This organization is
an equivalent to 911 services in the United
States. During the heat wave, he PPP local
agencies collaborated with BSPP and
SAMU/SMUR to assist people who fainted,
in particular homeless people.
Paris Firefighters Squads also called
Brigade des Sapeurs Pompiers de Paris
(BSPP): One of their missions is to alleviate
citizens’ immediate suffering and to pro-
vide assistance in emergency situations.
Their area of expertise is not restricted
solely to damage from fires due to the fact
that firefighter squads include medical per-
sonnel. The BSPP is officially a military or-
ganization, a characteristic that distinguish-
es it from squads of firefighters from other
regions. Its hierarchy and values are similar
to those of the army. On the field, the
BSPP extensively coordinates with the
SAMU/SMUR teams in managing patient
transfers into hospitals.
Paris Town Hall: The Paris Town Hall
provided material support to health care
organizations. In addition, they transmitted
alerting information to the public in rela-
tion to hyperthermia. Finally, they collect-
ed data about victims when these data




These organizations do not extensively
coordinate with the other organizations
from the network in routine situations.
However, they developed ad hoc connec-
tions with other organizations during the
heat wave.
1. National organizations
Weather forecast agency called in
French Météo France: Météo France is in
charge of providing national weather fore-
casts. Prior to the crisis there was already
coordination between Météo France and
the InVS. Météo France was in charge of
providing updated information on the
weather on a regular basis.
The Social Affairs Ministry also called
Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de l’Em-
ploi: This ministry is in charge of social is-
sues such as social exclusion and unem-
ployment. In 2002 as well as on the 26th of
May 2003, the Ministry anticipated that the
elderly could suffer from the heat during
the summer and sent a fax to local govern-
mental agencies to recommend extra atten-
tion on this specific point. During the heat
wave, this ministry was involved in the re-
sponse by participating in inter-ministry
meetings beginning the 11th of August.
However, the Social Affairs Ministry mem-
bers remained isolated and stated that they
received scarce information from health
care organizations.
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Funeral homes also called Pompes
Funèbres: Funeral home companies usual-
ly do not coordinate with hospitals but
with town halls and prefectures. However
during the heat wave, the lack of coffins to
stock corpses was problematic. For this
reason, hospitals developed extensive co-
ordination with funeral companies. Fur-
thermore, funeral homes participated in
some inter-organizational meetings. The
leading company on the market was the
only organization that was able to provide
statistics related to mortality at a quick
rate. Given data about coffin orders and
the fact that they corner approximately
25% of the market, it was easy for them to
determine an estimated number of fatali-
ties. Thus they transmitted their data about
death rates to ministries since the 12th of
August.
Journalists: Television journalists from
local and national channels as well as local
and national newspapers journalists, such
as Le Parisien had frequent interactions
with crisis responders. From the beginning
of the crisis, firefighter squads were fol-
lowed by journalists. News programs
broadcasted interviews with surgeons and
provided advice to avoid hyperthermia. In
addition, some medics participated in tele-
vision and radio programs to alert the pub-
lic to the situation. Journalists heavily criti-
cized the lack of reactivity from national
health care organizations such as the DGS,
INVS and the Health Ministry. As the num-
ber of fatalities came as a surprise, journal-
ists investigated how data was managed,
which resulted in a political and social
controversy. During the last phase of the
crisis response, press conferences were
frequent and some administrative actors
permitted inter-organizational meetings to
be recorded as evidence of their willing-
ness to remain transparent. Internet users,
including journalists, covered the evolution
of the heat wave and interacted with the
population through articles and comments
about web pages.
French Emergency Room Technician
Trade Union, or Association des Médecins
Urgentistes de France (AMUF): This trade
union was particularly active in July 2003
and alerted the public about bed short-
ages. The union leader intervened on tele-
vision by sending out an alert about the
massive amount of deaths on August 10th,
asserting that such deaths could have been
avoided and were not natural. On that
point he experienced an open conflict with
the DGS director who claimed at that time
that he was a liar. The trade union leader
intervened in ad hoc transversal meetings
that took place on the 11th and the 13th of
August.
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Disparate signals Loose signal detection starts on the 4th. There are disparate signals
from emergency professionals, such as SAMU and BSPP. For example,
the DDASS from Britain signaled the suspicious deaths of three persons
under the age of 60. These signals were reported to the heads of the
INVS and the DGS, who expressed their concern regarding the health
effects caused by the heat. One of the Health ministry’s advisers then
asks his delegates to write an alert message to health professionals on
the 6th. The writing of the alert message follows a full validation pro-
cess that takes more than 36 hours. Similarly some of the AP-HP direc-
tors informally meet emergency squad members on the 5th to voice
their concerns about the heat.




The situation rapidly worsens. Health care operational actors become
overwhelmed and begin to improvise. The AP-HP sends an alert that
basically asks the hospital staff to mobilize itself, help each other with
patients and prepare to face difficulties because the weather should be
hot during the weekend. They ask them to act as if the White plan was
on the scene. On Friday morning the situation remains under control.
Still, during the afternoon, all the emergency squads are overwhelmed
with patients and requests. During the weekend, the situation worsens
even more for all emergency squads: emergency units in hospitals,
SAMU and SMUR, firefighters, SOS médecins. During the weekend
many field actors develop improvisation practices, ranging from the ad
hoc information system between firefighters and SAMU to innovative
uses of ice in hospitals. At the end of the weekend, the AMUF leader
alerts the public opinion on television and asserts that deaths are nu-
merous and the situation is more than critical. Some administrative ac-
tors then participate in the ongoing collective improvisation, such as
AP-HP and DHOS, who provided extra resources.
Between the 8th
and the 10th
What do we do
now?
From the 11th, the administrative sphere recognizes that the situation is
out of control and attempts to resolve several issues. The catastrophe is
taking place and panic emerges because no organization has a precise
idea of the number of deaths. The hospital’s staff is exhausted, as the
AMUF leader claims on television. Transversal meetings between
DHOS, DGS, AP-HP, InVS and Health Ministry advisers take place on





Since the afternoon of the 13th, the situation gets better; the tempera-
tures and the attendance of emergency services simultaneously de-
crease. However, the administrative sphere has settled into heavy data
collection processes on the hospitals’ activities, which requires hour-
per-hour reports from services in critical situations about patients,
deaths and temperatures in rooms. In the afternoon the Internal Affairs
Ministry officially triggers the national emergency plan, also called
“White Plan”. From this time on, the effort to compile statistics of death
rates start and the political controversy surrounding the government’s
ability to handle the situation develops. It is the end of the organiza-
tional crisis but the beginning of the political crisis.
Between the 13th
and the 20th
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Appendix D. References on the heat wave
Table 1. Classification of essays
Title, authors & source Proximity Reliability
Les systèmes de santé en questions: Allemagne, France, Royau-
me-Uni, États-Unis et Canada, A-L. Le Faou., 2003, Paris, Édi-
tions Ellipses
Medium Medium
Canicules, La santé publique en question, L. Abenhaim, 2003
Editions Fayard
High Medium
Urgentiste, P. Pelloux, 2004, Editions Fayard. Medium Low
Les chiffres de la canicule. Lettre d’information de Pénombre,
2003, December
High Low
Heat Wave: A social autopsy of disaster in Chicago, E. Klinen-
berg. The university of Chicago Press
Medium High
Table 2. Classification of academic studies
Title, authors & source Proximity Reliability
Impact sanitaire de la vague de chaleur d’Août 2003 : Premier
résultats et travaux à mener. Bulletin épidémiologique Hebdo-
madaire – Novembre 2003
High Medium
The heat wave in France in August 2003, D. Hémon, E. Jougla.
Revue épidémiologique de santé publique, Février 2004
Medium High
Média et Santé publique : l’exemple de la canicule pendant l’été
2003 en France, Boyer, L., Robitail, S., Debensasion, D., Pas-
quier, P. Revue d’épidémiologie et de santé publique, 2005
Medium Medium
Understanding the French 2003 Heat Wave Experience: Beyond
the heat, a multi-layered challenge, P. Lagadec. Journal of con-
tingencies and crisis management, 2004
High High
August 2003: Reflections in a French summer Disaster, Thirion,
Debeusasorn. Journal of crisis and contingencies management,
2004
High High
Taking off the heat: Narrative sensemaking in post-crisis inquiry
reports. Boudes T., and Laroche H. Organization Studies 377-396,
2009
High High
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Table 3. Classification of reports
Title, authors & source Proximity Reliability
Rapport de la mission d’expertise et d’évaluation du système de
santé pendant la canicule 2003, Lalande, Legrain, Valleron,
Meyniel, Fourcade. Ministère de la santé, de la famille et des
personnes handicapées, 2003, 61 p.
High Medium
Surmortalité liée à la canicule d’Août 2003. Rapport d’étape –
Hermon, Jougla. INSERM, septembre 2003. 59 p.
High Medium
Apport Information Canicule : La crise sanitaire et sociale dé-
clenchée par la canicule, D. Jacquat, 580 p.
High Medium
Impact sanitaire de la vague de chaleur d’Août 2003 en France,
M. Ledrans, H. Isnard.  Institut de veille sanitaire (INVS), Oc-
tobre 2003, 120 p.
Medium Medium
Continuité et permanence des soins libéraux Durant l’été 2003,
J-C Cuenat, C. Daniel, R. Olivier, T. Roquel.  Inspection générale
des affaires sociales, 63 p.
High Medium
Rapport sur les rapports d’enquête sur la canicule, Lagadec,
Schepens, Laroche.  Revue pluridisciplinaire en sciences hu-
maines, 275 p, 2004
High High
La France et les Français face à la canicule : les leçons d’une
crise, Létard, Flandre, Lepeltier, 2004, 405 p.
High Medium
Rapport n° 1455 au nom de la commission d’enquête sur les
conséquences sanitaires et sociales de la canicule, F. Aubert,
573 p.
High Medium
WHO Regional Committee for Europe (2003) Heatwaves: im-
pacts and responses, WHO, 11p.
Medium Medium
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Table 4. Classification of newspapers articles
Source, title & date Proximity Reliability
Le Monde, La sécheresse persistante fait craindre un été catastro-
phique, 20th of July 2003.
High Low
Le Monde, Canicule et sécheresse, un double choc exceptionnel,
6th of August 2003.
High Low
Le Monde, La canicule s’installe pour une semaine, 6th of Au-
gust 2003
High Low
Le Monde, La canicule a provoqué lundi la mort d’un homme de
32 ans dans le Sud-Ouest, 8th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, Jean-Pierre Raffarin et Roselyne Bachelot n’ont pas
créé de cellule spéciale pour gérer la crise, 10th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, La vague de chaleur devrait durer encore huit jours,
7th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, La canicule serait responsable de la mort d’une cin-
quantaine de personnes en Ile-de-France, 12th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, les urgentistes s’alarment du nombre de décès, 12th
of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, La prévention, remède essentiel contre l’hyperthermie,
13th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, Nonchalance, 13th of August 2003 High Low
Le Monde, hospitaliers s’estiment à présent confrontés à une «
épidémie de coups de chaleur », 13th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, Canicule : premières réactions du gouvernement,
13th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde,  Douze jours pour prendre conscience d’un « drame
humain », 15th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, Le Plan blanc est activé, 15th of August 2003 High Low
Le Monde, Les autorités sanitaires envisagent 3 000 morts liées à
la chaleur, 15th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, LUCIEN ABENHAÏM, directeur général de la santé «
Cela correspond à ce que l’on observe dans les épidémies de grip-
pe », 15th of August 2003
High Low
Le Monde, Mourir, en France, sous la canicule, 15th of August 2003 High Low
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 81(10), France
caught cold by Heatwave, 2003
High Low
Libération, Canicule : comment les chiffres ont flambé, 18th of
December 2003
High Low
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